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result would be the denial of trial by jury where jury trials are presently
made available. Thus, the effect of the present case could have been con-
traction rather than an expansion of the right to jury trial. Related with
this is the fact that were the line drawn at one year, the pressure up0i1
criminal courts to reform for the sake of more efficient administration to
that extent would have been diminished. The logic is simple. It is easier
and less expensive to try more criminal offenses to the bench than to add
more judges and expand facilities, in order to cope with problems of backlog
and caseload. Thus, in drawing the line as it has, the Court has not ignored
the practical problems of administering criminal justice in our cities.
Implicit in Baldwin is an admonition to those charged with the adminis-
tration of such systems, that while the problems are real, the solution is
not infringement upon constitutional rights and privileges.89
PAUL A. BATrAGLIA
DIVORCE LAW-DEFECTIvE MEXICAN DIVORCE DECREE ACCORDED NEW
YORK RECOGNITION DUE TO SUBSEQUENT APPEARANCE, THROUGH AN ATTOR-
-NEY, OF PARTY ABSENT FROM THE MEXICAN ACTION
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1938 in the State of New York
and continued to reside there until 1950 when the defendant abandoned
their residence. The defendant obtained a Mexican divorce decree in 1960
by personally appearing before a civil court in Juarez, Mexico. The plain-
tiff did not appear in that proceeding, nor did she receive service of process.'
In 1962 the plaintiff signed a document styled, "Defendant's Special Power
of Attorney,"2 which empowered a Mexican attorney to appear in plain-
89. The Court in Baldwin rather summarily dismissed the proposed three judge
panel provided for by § 40 of the N.Y.C. CRIM. CT. AcT as a sufficient substitute for the
constitutional guarantee of jury trial. The Court suggested that the "primary purpose of
ihe jury is to prevent the possibility of oppression by the government." Thus, they con-
cluded, the proposed panel "can hardly serve as a substitute for a jury trial." Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 n.20 (1970).
I. New York will not recognize a Mexican decree in which one of the parties thereto
is neither present, nor served with process. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130
N.E.2d 902 (1955); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 151, 81 N.E.2d 60, 63 (1948), modi-
fying 272 App. Div. 1025, 73 N.Y.S.2d 683 (2d Dep't 1947); Lamb v. Lamb, 307 N.Y.S.2d
318, 321 (Fam. Ct. 1969).
2. The opinion of the Appellate Division gave the following as the relevant text of
the power of attorney:
[T]o appear for and represent me in the divorce action that my husband ...has
instituted against me . . .and to state in my name, that I am in complete conformity
with the judgment which was rendered in the said action, that I submit myself ex-
pressly to the jurisdiction of the Court and that I accept the aforesaid judgment as
final and conclusive; and generally to act . . .with full power of substitution, hereby
ratifying and confirming and holding valid all that my said attorney shall lawfully do
or cause to be done by virtue of these presents.
Ramm v. Ramm, 34 App. Div. 2d 667, 668, 310 N.Y.S.2d 111, 113 (2d Dep't 1970) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
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tiff's behalf before the decree granting court for the purpose' of submitting
to the, jurisdiction of that court and assenting to its judgment. Plaintiff
signed the document with the understanding that it was a prerequisite to
the release of $15,000 held in escrow for her by the defendant, and the
validation of the prior divorce decree. In 1962, two years after the original
decree, an attorney, other than the one named in the agreement, appeared
before the Mexican court to have the court recognize the plaintiff's appear-
ance3 and her conformity with the prior divorce decree. The attorney re-
quested that the court declare the earlier judgment res judicata, and
invulnerable to attack collaterally or directly. The court acknowledged the
plaintiff's appearance and added it to the file of the original divorce action.
Subsequently, the plaintiff brought an action to have the Mexican decree
declared void contending that: (1) Mexican courts have no authority to re-
open divorce cases; (2) plaintiff neither appeared at the submission of the
power of attorney, nor on the date the court rendered judgment based on
the power of attorney, and therefore, the Mexican decision was not in con-
formity with the personal contract requirements set forth in Rosenstiel v.
Rosenstiel;4 (3) the appearance of the Mexican attorney in her behalf was
unauthorized and; (4) her appearance was procured by means of a contract
in violation of section 5-311 of the General Obligations Law.5 The Supreme
Court, Queens County, entered judgment for the defendant and dismissed
the action.6 Plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment. Held, the belated appearance of the plaintiff through an authorized
attorney, which resulted in a post judgment declaration by the Mexican
court that the original divorce decree was res judicata, rendered the
divorce recognizable in New York as of the date of appearance. Rrmm
v. Ramm, 34 App. Div. 2d 667, 310 N.Y.S.2d 111 (2d Dep't 1970).In adjudicating the validity of foreign bilateral divorces,7 New York
courts refuse to determine whether a genuine residence or domicile exists
within the divorce granting nation.8 In doing so, New York courts have
rejected the domicile theory of marriage with its concomitant jurisdictional
3. Mexican decrees have been held valid if there is an appearance of the absent party
through a duly authorized attorney. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709,
262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 940, cert denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966); Parrish
v. Parrish, 50 Misc. 2d 827, 833, 271 N.Y.S.2d 792, 797-98 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
4. 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 940,
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966).
5. N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-311 (McKinney 1964).
6. Ramm v. Ramm, 160 N.Y.L.J. 120 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1969).
7. Bilateral indicates a divorce in which personal jurisdiction is acquired over both
parties, and each participates in the proceeding. Such appearance may be through an
attorney.
8. This policy was ostensibly begun in 1938 with the decision of Leviton v. Leviton,
6 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup, Ct. 1938); see Comment, Mexican Divorce-A Survey, 33 FoRDAm L.
REv. 449 (1965).
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requirements based on the state's interest in the marital res.9 New York
courts do not find the question of jurisdiction to be the sine qua non of
recognition.' 0 Rather, they base their decision on whether recognition would
contravene the public policy of the state." The determination of public
policy is vested in the legislature and the courts of the state.'2 While the
legislature has not been concise as to its policy, the courts have manifested
a distinctly liberal attitude towards bilateral divorce recognition. In Matter
of Rhinelander,13 the Court of Appeals declared:
It is no part of the public policy of this state to refuse recognition to
divorce decrees of foreign states . . . even when the parties go from this
state to the foreign state for the purpose of obtaining the decree and
do obtain it on grounds not recognized here.14
Where the residence requirement of the decree granting jurisdiction is en-
tirely synthetic the New York courts have still accorded recognition."
The critical issue in these decisions is whether due process has been
satisfied. An opportunity to be heard and proper notice are intrinsic to due
process.'B If both parties are personally served within the decree granting
jurisdiction, or both appear personally, these two requirements are met. It
has been held that due process is not complied with where one of the parties
to the action is neither served with process, nor appears and submits to the
jurisdiction of the court.17 However, due process can be fulfilled where one
9. The domicile theory centers on the interest of the state in the marriage and Is a
policy of exclusivity. Under this theory, marriage is a status in which the state has
an interest, and this interest gives the state the right to assume control over the
marital status. Because the state of domicile has been designated to best represent
the state with the requisite interest, the law which is applied to the marital status is
the law of the parties' domicile.
Comment, Mexican Bilateral Divorce-A Catalyst In Divorce Jurisdiction Theory?, 61 Nw.
U.L. REv. 584, 591 (1966).
10. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 940, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966).
11. Id.; Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296, 12 N.E.2d 305, reargument denied, 277 N.Y.
652, 14 N.E.2d 205 (1938); Leviton v. Leviton, 6 N.Y.S.Qd 535 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd and
modified mem., 254 App. Div. 670, 4 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Ist Dep't 1938).
12. DePena v. DePena, 31 App. Div. 2d 415, 298 N.Y.S.2d 188 (lst Dep't 1969); see
Borax' Estate v. Commissioner Int. Rev., 349 F.2d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 935 (1966); Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296, 12 N.E.2d 305, reargument denied, 277
N.Y. 652, 14 N.E.2d 205 (1938).
13. 290 N.Y. 31, 47 N.E.2d 681 (1943); accord, Tanburn v. Tanburn, 114 N.Y.S.2d 670,
672 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
14. Matter of Rhinelander, 290 N.Y. at 36-37,47 N.E.2d at 684.
15. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 940, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966).
16. Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due
Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation of life. liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
17. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 390 N.Y. 371, 376, 130 N.E.2d 902, 904 (1955).
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of the parties appears personally and the other appears through an attor-
ney.18
The great lengths that New York courts go to recognize foreign bi-
lateral decrees is evidenced by the decisions holding that a prior void de-
cree, defective owing to the absence of one of the parties to the action, can
subsequently be validated through a belated appearance of the absent party.
In Matter of Rhinelander,19 after the wife made a delayed appearance, the
court held the decree to be of the same force and effect as if originally ob-
tained through the appearance of both parties. Similar results prevailed in
Valentine v. Valentine.20 There the court held a prior New York judgment,
declaring a Florida decree invalid, not to be res judicata in a subsequent
New York action that validated the Florida decree. The rationale of the
decision was that a subsequent appearance, by the wife, cured any jurisdic-
tional defects in the original decree. In a parallel case,2 ' a husband pro-
cured a Mexican ex parte divorce.22 One year later, his wife submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court through an attorney. The supreme court held
that the decree had been cured of defects, and was entitled to the effect of
res judicata in New York. The court reasoned that the Mexican decree was
not a nunc pro tunc order,23 which Mexican law did not recognize, but was
a recording of the absent party's submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
That case established that not only may the appearance be delayed but it
also may be entered through an attorney. The appearance through an attor-
ney, however, must neither be unauthorized,24 nor borne out of a collusive
agreement that contemplates the dissolution of the marriage.2 5
An attorney may appear on behalf of one of the parties through a power
of attorney.20 The relationship thus created is one of principal-agent. 27 If
18. Skolnick v. Skolnick, 24 Misc. 2d 1077, 1078, 204 N.Y.S.2d 68, 64 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
19. 290 N.Y. 31, 47 N.E.2d 681 (1943).
20. 280 App. Div. 795, 112 N.Y.S.2d 879 (2d Dep't 1952).
21. Hytell v. Hytell, 44 Misc. 2d 663, 254 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
22. Ex parte indicates a divorce in which only one of the parties is present, and the
absent party is merely constructively served with process.
23. "A method of amending a court record. An order entered to take effect as of an
earlier time." BALLENITNE's LAw DICTIONARY 873 (3d ed. 1969).
24. Prior to 1963, only twice were foreign bilateral divorces declared void in New
York. Both adverse decisions were due to a defective power of attorney. MacPherson v.
MacPherson, 1 Misc. 2d 1049, 149 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Molnar v. Molnar, 131
N.Y.S.2d 120 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd mem., 284 App. Div. 948, 135 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Ist Dep't
1954).
25. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-311 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
26. "IThe instrument by which the authority of one person to act in place and stead
of another as attorney in fact is set forth. In re Katz' Estate, 152 Misc. 757, 274
N.Y.S. 202 (Sur. Ct. 1934).
27. In re Katz' Estate, 152 Misc. 757, 274 N.Y.S. 202 (Sur. Ct. 1934).
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the attorney exceeds the authority, either expressed or implied28 in the in-
strument, the principal will not be bound by his acts.29 The attorney may,
if authorized, delegate his authority to a subagent.30 An agent, however,
cannot delegate authority conferred upon him personally, unless there is
some manifestation of consent from the principal.31 This requirement is
particularly applicable where the principal-agent relationship is one where
personal trust or confidence is reposed. In this situation, authority cannot
be delegated unless there is a special power of substitution either express
or implied.32 An unauthorized appearance by an attorney, on behalf of a
non-resident, does not give the court jurisdiction over the non-resident, and
a personal judgment thus rendered is void.33
Even though due process has been satisfied and a power of attorney is
valid, New York courts may still refuse to recognize a foreign divorce where
it is repugnant to public policy.34 With regard to a contract to dissolve a
marriage, New York's policy is enunciated in section 5-311 of the General
Obligations Law. Under this statute, a husband and wife cannot contract to
alter or dissolve their marriage. A divorce procured pursuant to such a con-
tract will not be accorded recognition in New York.35 This restriction has
been qualified, however, by an amendment requiring an express provision
in the agreement as a requisite for a finding of collusion.30 Therefore, if
such an agreement lacks an express provision calling for the dissolution of
the marriage, section 5-311 of the General Obligations Law is not violated.
Given the presumption of regularity attached to official proceedings,3 7 a
foreign bilateral divorce, procured through an authorized attorney not in
28. Implied authority may be viewed as actual 'authority given implicitly by a prin-
cipal to his agent' or as a 'kind of authority arising solely from the designation by the
principal of a kind of agent who ordinarily possesses certain powers.'
Masuda v. Kawaski Dockyard Co., 328 F.2d 662, 664 (2d Cir. 1964).
29. A principal is not bound by his agent's acts in excess of his actual authority
where the facts and circumstances are such to put the person dealing with the agent upon
inquiry as to the power of the agent. Amusement Securities Corp. v. Academy Pictures
Dist. Corp., 251 App. Div. 227, 295 N.Y.S. 436 (1st Dep't 1937), aJJ'd, 277 N.Y. 557, 13
N.E.2d 471 (1938); In re Steinmetz' Estate, 1 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sur. Ct. 1937).
30. Wilson & Co. v. Smith, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 763 (1845).
31. Paige v. Faure, 229 N.Y. 114, 127 N.E. 898 (1920).
32. Warner v. Martin, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 209 (1850); Skutt, Inc. v. Goodwin, Ltd.,
251 App. Div. 84, 295 N.Y.S. 772 (4th Dep't 1937).
33. Amusement Securities Corp. v. Academy Pictures Dist. Corp., 251 App. Div. 227,
295 N.Y.S. 436 (1st Dep't 1937), afj'd, 227 N.Y. 557, 13 N.E.2d 471 (1938).
34. "A contract which binds one of the parties to do that which is contrary to the
policy of the state or nation is void .. " In re Hughes' Will, 225 App. Div. 29, 31, 232
N.Y.S. 84, 86 (4th Dep't 1928), aff'd, 251 N.Y. 529, 168 N.E. 415 (1929).
35. N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONs LAw § 5-311 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
36. "An agreement, heretofore or hereafter made between a husband and wife, shall
hot be considered a contract to alter or dissolve the marriage unless it contains an express
provision requiring the dissolution of the marriage. N.Y. GEN. OBLIcATIoNs LAw §
5-311 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
37. RcnAR.soN' ON EVIDENcE 48 (9th ed. 1964).
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violation of section 5-311, will result in a divorce recognizable in New York
State.
In the instant case, the court adopts the holding of Hytell v. Hytel. 38
The court quotes with approval from Hytell: ". . the judgment of divorce,
even if originally defective, became res judicata by judicial declaration
because [it was] expressly consented to by [the] plaintiff through her attor-
ney acting under a power of attorney. . ... -9 The court's opinion is in
fundamental conflict with the perspective in which the plaintiff views the
gravamen of the dispute. In response to the plaintiff's efforts to demonstrate
the nugatory effect of the Mexican divorce law in New York, the court
simply asserts the applicability of Mexican res judicata in New York. The
effect is that New York will recognize a Mexican bilateral divorce so ob-
tained by its citizen-residents. While the court is under no compulsion to
give full faith and credit to the judgments of a foreign nation, the opinion
accepts the Mexican decree as valid under the concept of comity.40 Comity
does not mandate that the decision be given the effect of res judicata where
the effect is repugnant to public policy.41 However, the court felt that
"... the mandates of sound jurisprudence and public policy . . . require
that the decree be given that res judicata effect which it is accorded in the
rendering jurisdiction." 42 Consequently, the court held that the plaintiff
should be barred from relitigating the issues decided in the Mexican action
if' the plaintiff did, in fact, appear.
In response to the plaintiff's denial that she authorized the Mexican
attorney to appear on her behalf, the court pointed out that "[t]he record
is devoid of any explanation of the substitution . . .,,43 of another attorney.
The opinion stated that the plaintiff had failed to overcome the presump-
tion of regularity attached to a foreign nation's judgment.44 Concluding its:
argument for sustaining the decision of the lower court, the court rebutted
the contention that the agreement violated section 5-311 of the General Ob-
ligations Law. The court, citing Matter of Rhinelander,45 found that the
plaintiff's argument must fail because the agreement to sign the power of
attorney was made after the entry of the Mexican divorce decree, and lacked
an express provision requiring the dissolution of the marriage. , ,
The dissent would reverse the lower court's decision, and declare that'
the plaintiff and defendant were not legally divorced by virtue of the wife's
38. Hytell v. Hytell, 44 Misc. 2d 663, 254 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
39. Id. at 666, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
40. Schoenbrod v. Seigler, 20 N.Y.2d 403, 408, 230 N.E.2d 638, 640, 283 N.Y.S.2d 881,
884 (1967).
41. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955); DePena v. De-
Pena, 31 App. Div. 2d 415, 298 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1st Dep't 1969).
42. Instant case at 669, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 115.
43. Id.
44. See RiCHARDSON ON EVI ENcE 48 (9th ed. 1964).
45. 290 N.Y. 31, 47 N.E.2d 681 (1943).
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questionable appearance. 46 The dissent rejected the statement by the court
that it was applying Mexican res judicata and not its divorce law. Further,
the effect of the majority's holding would be to give recognition to Mexican
divorce decrees contrary to established New York precedent of refusing to
recognize such decrees where one of the parties is neither personally served
with process, nor appears in the action. The dissent also stated that the
dubious appearance of an attorney, two years after the original decree, could
not revive a legal nullity. After attempting to refute the majority's finding
that the record was devoid of evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption
of regularity, the dissent stated that the appearance of one not named in
the instrument raised a presumption of irregularity. Finally, the dissent
placed the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant in violation of
". the spirit if not the letter of section 5-311 of the General Obligations
Law. .. .
The difference in viewpoints between the majority and the dissent is
ostensibly one of interpretation. The majority, through an application of
authority in point, reaches a decision based on stare decisis. The dissent,
while uncovering no contrary holdings in point, reaches a diametrically op-
posed conclusion. The dissent apparently ignores a line of cases that have
upheld such divorces.
The dissent fails to consider the actual language of the power of attor-
ney. The instrument contained the words "full power of substitution." In-
stead of attempting to interpret this inclusion, the dissent proclaimed that
the appearance of an attorney other than the one named in the instrument
gave rise to a presumption of irregularity. In the face of the language of
the document, and the rule that ambiguous words are to be construed most
strictly against the principal,48 it is not clear how the dissent reached its
conclusion.
The appearance of the plaintiff, through an attorney, was made in 1962.
Yet the plaintiff waited over three years to attack the validity of the judg-
ment. Since that time, the defendant had remarried and relocated. Quite
possibly this case could have been disposed of by denying plaintiff relief
on equitable principles. In Farber v. Farber,49 which, on the facts, is similar
to the instant case, the plaintiff's action was barred due to laches where she
had delayed three years before commencing same. If a three year delay gave
46. Instant case at 670, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
47. Id. at 671, 810 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
48. Silver Bay Ass'n v. London, 121 Misc. 712, 201 N.Y.S. 868 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd,
215 App. Div. 852, 213 N.Y.S. 910 (3d Dep't 1926).
49. 25 App. Div. 2d 850, 269 N.Y.S.2d 608 (2d Dep't 1966).
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rise to laches in that case, the three year delay in this case should also give
rise to laches.50 "
The instant case does not signal a new policy as to the recognition of
foreign divorces. It follows the holdings of Hytel-a case quite similar on
the facts. The difference in the instant case is the court's reluctance to delve
into the proceedings that took place in Mexico, to determine if they were
indeed regular. The court's decision alludes to the idea that if Mexico re-
gards a bilateral divorce as res judicata, New York will not question that
determination. Rather than a new policy, this case represents a further de-
lineation of the boundaries of the present policy towards foreign bilateral
divorce recognition.51 The decision signifies a liberalization in degree and
not kind.
New York has done little to alleviate the inequities inherent in its di-
vorce policy. An amendment to section 170 of the Domestic Relations Law,52
while liberalizing the grounds for divorce, did so at the expense of the
inclusion of a mandatory conciliation clause.53 This has not resulted in a
decrease in the number of migratory divorces. 54 Likewise, the enactment of
section 250 of the Domestic Relations Law,55 which attempted to clarify
New York's position as to the migratory divorce, has had little effect on the
recognition of Mexican bilateral decrees.5 6 The result is tacit legislative en-
dorsement of a divorce policy under which only those with sufficient re-
sources are entitled to the convenience of a second and more liberal divorce
forum.
50. Compare Bigelow v. Bigelow, 27 Misc. 2d 124, 213 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1961),
with Fusaro v. Fusaro, 236 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 18 App. Div. 2d 714, 237 N.Y.S.2d
989 (2nd Dep't 1962).
51. Similarly, the cases discussed previously, dealing with Mexican bilateral divorce
recognition, have delimited the extent to which these divorces will be accorded validity
in New York.
52. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAWw § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
53. Id. § 215(a) and (b); see Note, Divorce Law-Compulsory Conciliation Through
The Judicia -- New York Domestic Relations Law, Article 11-B, 31 ALBANY L REv. 114
(1967).
54. Before the amendment to section 170 of the Domestic Relations Law, it was esti-
mated that of the 18,000 divorces granted each year in Juarez, ninety percent or more went
to New Yorkers. Foster, Divorce Reform, 22 N.Y. COUNTY B. BuL. 165, 168 (1965). In
1969, three years after the amendment took effect, more than half of the 45,000 Juarez
divorces granted in that year went to New York couples. N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1970, at 1,
col. 6 (city ed.).
55. Proof that a person obtaining a divorce in another jurisdiction was (a) domiciled
in this state within twelve months prior to the commencement of the proceeding there-
for, and resumed residence in this state within eighteen months after the date of his
departure therefrom, or (b) at all times after his departure from this state until his
return maintained a place of residence within this state, shall be prima facie evidence
that the person was domiciled in this state when the divorce proceeding was commenced.-
N.Y. DoM. REL LAw § 250 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
56. Rosenstiel apparently is still the authority as to foreign bilateral divorce recogni-
tion. In Kakarapis v. Kakarapis, 58 Misc. 2d 515, 296 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Fain. Ct. 1968), the
supreme court held, inter alia, that § 250 did not change the holding that public policy
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On August 11, 1970, President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz proposed legislation
that would ". . . kill the present system of quick divorces in . .. Juarez." 7
Chihuahua, which includes Juarez, is the only Mexican state where it is
possible to establish immediate residence for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce. The proposed amendment to the Mexican Nationality and Natu-
ralization Law would establish a "federal certificate" as the only valid proof
of residence for all Mexican federal, state and municipal court actions. The
amendment is being considered by the congress which convened September
first. "The overwhelming majority in the congress of the President's Revolu-
tionary Institutional Party virtually assures approval."58
New York courts have contended with the issue of Mexican migratory
divorces for many years. The product of this litigation is a body of law re-
plete with inequities. The passage of the proposed Mexican law would deny
New Yorkers the availability of "quickie" Mexican bilateral divorces. Ironi-
cally, the problems presented to New York courts by migratory divorce
recognition may soon be solved by Mexico.
WARREN B. ROSENBAUM
EMINENT DOMAIN-IMERMISSIBLE TO BASE MARKET VALUE OF
CONDEMNED LAND SOLELY ON CAPITALIZATION OF INCOME ExPECTED To BE
REALIZED FROM BUILDINGS ON WHICH No WORK HAD BEEN DONE AS OF THE
DAY OF TAKING
The claimants, fee owners (Siegel et al.), had assembled a 26.78 acre
parcel which was leased to the claimant tenant (Banner Holding Corp., the
assignor of Arlen of Nanuet). On May 10, 1961, four months after the
assemblage, the State appropriated slightly more than sixteen acres of the
vacant land for highway purposes. The fee owners had paid $247,800.00
for the 26.78 acres. It was leased to the tenant for a 25-year term, at an
annual ground rent after the first year of $61,250.00. The obligation of
the subtenant, Korvette, was to become effective upon completion of the
construction. Korvette was to pay an annual sublease rental of $285,000.00
to Banner. This sum included not only a payment for land use, but also
a reward to the tenant for construction costs and risk. As of April, 1961,
it was uncertain whether the claimant's land would be condemned. To
guard against the eventuality of condemnation, the tenant, on April 13,
1961, obtained a ground lease on an adjacent 26-acre site. After condemna-
requires that recognition be extended to bilateral foreign divorces; see Comment, Does
Residence Equal Domicile? Divorce Regulation Under New York Domestic Relations Law
§ 250, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 831 (1967).
57. N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1970, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.).
58. Id.
